I don’t have the time or ability at the moment to fully address the democratic process in Nepal at the length I would like. However, there’s been some interesting events lately so I feel it needs to be touched on in some fashion. The Maoists are backpedaling on their recent statement about having a considerable stock of weapons outside UN containment, as expected. Even the Maoists do not want to jeopardize the peace process at the moment. When the government becomes more stable, interests clash, and they ultimately fail to deliver the desired social legislation to the people – then we will see how committed these factions are to peace.
Federalism is a wise decision. Nepal has a number of ethnic groups and strong regional identities based on rural kinship structures. This is not to say they have anything even close to the identity conflicts that exist in areas like Iraq or Rwanda, but when people protest in the streets for independence, cutting their base out from under them with a federalist system will help keep the country united.
International Crisis Group has come up with several excellent policy prescription reports for Nepal that are far more detailed and erudite than anything I could deliver. On the note of federalism, their latest deals with the constitutional process. A point I found interesting:
“8. Carry out internal reforms in line with Article 142(3)(c) of the interim constitution, including the setting of minimum quotas, to improve the representation and participation of women and minorities such as dalits and ethnic groups in party bodies such as central committees.”
It is notable that the only party that has any kind of substantial female or dalit population is the Maoist party. The Maoists, like nearly all leftist revolutionary groups, were based among the marginalized, including women, minorities, and much of the rural population who felt ignored by the insider politics of Kathmandu. One of International Crisis Group’s complaints earlier in their prescription is that there is little popular democracy as of yet – that it remains an inside game. All democracy, at one point or another, is an inside game. It’s doubtful that we’ll really see anyone other than elites in the Nepalese political circuit for a long time. What’s important is to establish that these elites represent the interests of the people. I don’t know how much the Maoists, once they have tasted the nectar of power, will keep their ties to their marginalized base – and as I mentioned earlier, I doubt any social legislation will be as widespread or as effective as the people desire. All we can do is hope the institutions established are strong enough to bar serious corruption or tyranny. As the International Crisis Group states:
“The demise of the 1990 Constitution illustrates that no new constitutional order will gain legitimacy unless it visibly incorporates public input. Diverse education efforts, including both local initiatives and internationally-funded projects, have already begun; expectations of significant changes have been aroused. However, there are no institutional structures to channel, process and consider the results of consultation. The Interim Constitution Drafting Commission invited public input but lacked a clear mandate or adequate mechanisms to deal with submissions. The result was public frustration and dissatisfaction with the end product. The CA process will need to do better if it is to deliver greater legitimacy.” (emphasis added)
The Maoist “economy” established in the countryside during the war – the “Prachanda Path” – was really more of a system of social services. People sided with the Maoists, as they side with Hamas and Hezbollah, because the Party was feeding, sheltering, and teaching them, while the state had failed to provide. The legitimacy of this new regime will hinge on two things – the belief in representation of the popular will (even if all politicians involved are still bourgeois elites and Maoist elites) and the effective delivery of desired services.
More later.
